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Developments and Potential Fragility in Corporate Bond Funds
Summary
Since the beginning of the global economic crisis, investors have flocked to bond funds, and especially
corporate bond funds, viewing them as the “safest” vehicles for their capital. However, bond funds are subject
to fragilities originating from the first-mover advantage problem: when investors cash out, the cost of
compensating them amplifies the funds’ price decline, making it costlier for other investors to remain.
Moreover, three other conditions—general market illiquidity, lower fund liquidity, and the prevalence of retail
investors—accentuate the financial fragility of corporate bond funds. Academic research shows that when
corporate bond fund managers have to trade illiquid corporate bonds after investors redeem shares en masse,
the subsequent demand shock in the secondary bond market results predictably in significant negative effects
to the real economy. This brief looks at the fragility of corporate bond funds and offers policy options to
combat these conditions and mitigate their wider effects.
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Where Have All the Investment 
Dollars Gone? A Brief on the 
Developments and Potential 
Fragility in Corporate Bond Funds
Itay Goldstein, PhD
From the beginning of 2008 to the spring of 2013, as fixed income fund assets 
were increasing several times faster than equity, money market, allocation, 
and all other fund assets combined, total bond fund assets nearly doubled.
This presents a challenge to researchers, regulators, and 
practitioners. Flows into and out of equity funds have 
been thoroughly researched over the past few decades, 
but there has been stunningly little investigation into 
the flow behavior of bond funds, which behave rather 
differently from equity funds and now account for a 
formidable portion of all investment. 
Over that same five year period, investment in 
corporate bond funds, specifically, roughly tripled 
from $600 billion to $1.7 trillion.1 These funds began 
to comprise a significant part of the overall corporate 
bond market by the end of 2013, which at that time 
was worth approximately $7.5 trillion, or close to half 
the size of the equity market. And when scanning the 
entire universe of bond funds, it is even more notewor-
thy that corporate bond funds accounted for 57% of 
all fixed income funds in 2013 [Figure 1]. Given the 
prominence of corporate bond funds, their potential 
market impact, and the stark contrasts to equity funds 
(i.e., corporate bond funds have higher turnover rates 
and shorter investment horizons despite trading in a 
market with lower liquidity), these vehicles are the best 
place to start shedding light on the largely dark field of 
bond fund flows. 
summary
•	 Since	the	beginning	of	 the	global	economic	crisis,	 investors	
have	flocked	 to	bond	 funds,	and	especially	 corporate	bond	
funds,	viewing	them	as	the	“safest”	vehicles	for	their	capital.
•	 However,	bond	funds	are	subject	to	fragilities	originating	from	
the	first-mover	advantage	problem:	when	investors	cash	out,	
the	cost	of	compensating	them	amplifies	the	funds’	price	de-
cline,	making	it	costlier	for	other	investors	to	remain.	Moreover,	
three	other	conditions—general	market	illiquidity,	lower	fund	
liquidity,	and	 the	prevalence	of	 retail	 investors—accentuate	
the	financial	fragility	of	corporate	bond	funds.
•	 Academic	research	shows	that	when	corporate	bond	fund	man-
agers	have	 to	 trade	 illiquid	 corporate	bonds	after	 investors	
redeem	shares en	masse,	 the	subsequent	demand	shock	 in	
the	secondary	bond	market	results predictably  in	significant	
negative	effects	to	the	real	economy.
•	 Several	options	are	available	to	combat	the	potential	fragility	in	
corporate	bond	funds	and	mitigate	their	wider	effects:	(1)	have	
the	funds	increase	their	liquidity	by	maintaining	more	cash	on	
hand;	(2)	 institute	emergency	redemption	rules	during	times	
of	macroeconomic	distress;	or	(3)	obviate	the	problem	of	first	
movers	by	changing	the	way	funds	calculate	redemption	prices.
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In this brief, I will break down the 
research I conducted with my co-
authors, Hao Jiang and David Ng, on 
fragility in corporate bond funds and 
offer suggestions, both policy-oriented 
and industry-based, for minimizing 
the potential for future runs and rapid 
price depression that might originate 
from the structure of bond funds—an 
outcome that could lead to negative 
macroeconomic effects.2 
ThE PRoBlEm oF FIRST 
movERS and accElERaTEd 
RUnS
The vast literature on equity fund 
flows reveals clearly that those funds 
are very sensitive to good past per-
formance and not especially sensitive 
to bad past performance. Therefore, 
there is no particularly strong concern 
that investors will rush to redeem 
their equity fund shares when the 
market encounters negative events, 
which would have the effect of further 
hurting the returns for the investors 
who choose to remain fund owners. 
In other words, the fragility of equity 
funds is quite limited in most cases, 
except for funds holding very illiquid 
assets.3 
Flows into corporate bond funds, 
however, do not behave in the same 
way. Under some circumstances, their 
outflows are actually more sensitive 
to bad performance than their inflows 
are sensitive to good performance. So 
in the face of a negative market event, 
investors are much more likely to 
exchange their fund shares for money. 
Portfolio adjustments then would 
occur in the days (or weeks, depending 
on how infrequently the assets trade) 
after investors redeem their shares, but 
investors receive money equal to the 
price of the fund the day they with-
draw. There is an obvious mismatch 
here between fund illiquidity and the 
investor’s claim to immediate (i.e., 
same day) liquidity. When managers 
are forced to sell the underlying assets 
of the fund to compensate redeemers, 
this imposes extra costs on the inves-
tors who remain in the fund, since 
any necessary liquidation costs are not 
 1 Feroli,	Kashyap,	Schoenholtz,	and	Shin	 (2014),	“Market	
Tantrums	and	Monetary	Policy,”	available	at	http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409092;	and	
Investment	Company	Institute	Fact	Book	(2014),	available	
at	https://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf.	
 2  This	brief	 is	based	extensively	off	Goldstein,	Jiang,	and	
Ng	(2015),	“Investor	Flows	and	Fragility	in	Corporate	Bond	
Funds,”	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2596948.	We	analyzed	actively	man-
aged	corporate	bond	 funds	 in	 the	years	between	1992	
and	2014	–	the	only	years	for	which	we	have	reliable	and	
consistent	data	 from	CRSP.	 Index	 funds,	ETFs,	and	ETNs	
were	excluded	 from	analysis	so	 that	we	could	compare	
our	findings	 to	 the	research	on	actively	managed	equity	
funds.	The	median	share-class	size	in	our	sample	was	$59	
million,	and	the	median	fund	age	was	6.88	years.	Our	final	
dataset	 included	4,679	unique	share	classes	and	1,660	
unique	corporate	bond	funds.
 3  Chen,	Goldstein,	and	Jiang	 (2010),	“Payoff	Complemen-
tarities	and	Financial	Fragility:	Evidence	from	Mutual	Fund	
Outflows,”	 available	at	 http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0304405X10000759.
 4  Bessembinder	and	Maxwell	(2008),	“Transparency	and	the	
Corporate	Bond	Market,”	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1082459.	For	context,	
three-fifths	of	fixed	income	trading	is	centered	around	U.S.	
Treasury	securities.
 5  Different	pricing	service	companies	or	securities	dealers	
might	price	underlying	bonds	differently,	and	bond	 fund	
managers	can	always	override	these	price	recommenda-
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This figure shows total net assets (TNA) and dollar flows of actively managed corporate bond funds from 1991 to 
2014 index corporate bond funds, exchange traded funds, and exchange traded notes from the CRSP are excluded.
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fully reflected in the price received by 
the redeemers but are absorbed by the 
remaining investors over time. This is 
what economists call negative exter-
nalities. These dynamics lead to what 
is known as a first-mover advantage 
problem. Put simply, if the price of 
a bond fund decreases, it could be 
expensive as an investor to remain in 
the fund because a price decline will 
be amplified by the costs of adjusting 
the fund portfolio to compensate the 
investors who cashed out first.
In addition to the problem of first 
movers, the amplified costs imposed 
by redemptions are accelerated in cor-
porate bond funds by the general illi-
quidity of the underlying assets. Even 
though corporate bonds comprise 
over 20% of all bonds outstanding 
in the U.S., as previously noted, they 
account for only about 2.5-3.0% of 
all U.S. bond trading.4 Illiquid assets 
come with higher liquidation costs, 
which are further heightened during 
periods of overall market illiquidity 
(see below). But not only are cor-
porate bond funds vulnerable to the 
aforementioned negative externalities 
and infrequent trading, they also must 
endure higher trading costs than other 
types of funds, as well as uncertain 
pricing.5
ThE BEhavIoR oF 
coRPoRaTE Bond FUnd 
FloWS
The research that my co-authors and 
I conducted recently tested three 
hypotheses concerning how investors 
in corporate bond funds make invest-
ment decisions. All three suppositions 
were confirmed in the data and guide 
the recommendations that follow.
•	 Hypothesis 1: Liquidation costs 
imposed from massive outflows will 
be greater during periods of overall 
market illiquidity, when trading 
costs are higher and pricing is more 
uncertain. In our implementa-
tion, we chose the VIX index, the 
TED spread, and Fed Funds rates 
as proxies for aggregate illiquidity 
and uncertainty, which were used 
to predict bond fund flows. We 
showed that they tend to amplify 
the sensitivity of outflows to bad 
performance.
•	 Hypothesis 2: Funds with lower 
asset liquidity—or, in our analysis, 
less cash—will be even more sensi-
tive to bad performance and will 
experience greater outflows. In our 
sample, the funds held, on average, 
3.5% of their assets in cash, but the 
amount varied widely with a stan-
dard deviation of 10%. The top 1% 
of funds held about 46.7% of their 
assets in cash while the bottom 1% 
of funds were actually leveraged and 
had negative cash holdings of about 
36.72%. Overall, less than a fifth of 
the funds were leveraged with nega-
tive cash holdings.
•	 Hypothesis 3: The effect of illiquid-
ity on the sensitivity of outflows 
to bad performance will weaken 
the more that fund ownership is 
composed of institutional instead 
of retail investors. We were able to 
conclude that the large size of insti-
tutional investors helped them to 
internalize the negative externalities.
General market illiquidity, lower 
fund liquidity, and the prevalence 
of retail investors are all signals for 
financial fragility in corporate bond 
funds recognized both by investors, 
who react more strongly to bad news 
in large part because of these condi-
tions, and fund managers themselves. 
Given the high costs associated with 
fragility, it might be expected that 
funds would put measures in place to 
mitigate the risks of massive outflows 
in response to negative developments. 
The SEC allows mutual funds to 
charge voluntary redemption fees in 
an effort to curb short term trading, 
but in practice, these fees are often not 
utilized by the industry. Funds com-
tions	and	mark	their	own	prices.
 6  Gilchrist	and	Zakrajsek	(2012),	“Credit	Spreads	and	Busi-
ness	Cycle	Fluctuations,”	available	at	http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17021.	
 7  Goldsteing,	Jiang,	and	Ng	(2015).
 8  See	Goldstein,	Jiang,	and	Ng	 for	a	case	study	on	 fund	
liquidity	 levels	 involving	PIMCO	after	the	departure	of	the	
company’s	founder	and	most	visible	manager,	“Bond	King”	
Bill	Gross.
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pete aggressively with each other for 
investor capital and such redemption 
fees are clearly seen as deterrents. 
EconomIc conSEqUEncES 
and REcommEndaTIonS
Established academic research shows 
that variation in excess bond pre-
miums, or credit risk premiums, 
can by itself predict with reasonable 
effectiveness certain macroeconomic 
outcomes.6 This is important for our 
purposes here because when corporate 
bond fund managers have to trade 
illiquid corporate bonds after investors 
redeem shares en masse, the subse-
quent demand shock in the secondary 
bond market can significantly impact 
corporate bond prices and excess bond 
premiums. To put this another way, 
the first-mover advantage problem 
sparks a demand problem in the 
corporate bond market, resulting in 
potentially and predictably significant 
negative effects in the real economy.
While the investigation into 
corporate bond flows’ influence on real 
macroeconomic outcomes is, at this 
point, only exploratory, we discovered 
that “an unanticipated increase by 
one percent in [corporate bond fund] 
outflow leads to reductions in future 
consumption, investment and output 
growth rates over the next several 
quarters. The macroeconomic effect 
of the outflow shock is quite substan-
tial.”7 Specifically, the GDP growth 
rate declined a statistically significant 
22 basis points over the subsequent 
three quarters after a surprise 1% rise 
in bond outflows.
Even with this knowledge, it is 
not clear that the potential fragility of 
corporate bond funds demand regula-
tory intervention. Some of the prob-
lems can be addressed by the funds 
themselves. Moreover, regulating one 
corner of the financial system could 
lead investors to flock to a different 
corner, the result of which may be 
increased fragility of a different fund 
type. This is what happened when the 
federal government increased regula-
tion on money market funds after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. 
Investors then fled quickly into bond 
funds. However, it is still the case that 
negative externalities may be present 
beyond bond funds and are not inter-
nalized by them to fully account for 
the first-mover advantage problem, so 
that some regulation may be prudent.
As for the actual steps that the 
industry might consider to combat 
fragility in corporate bond funds, sev-
eral options are available. One option 
is to increase liquidity in the funds. 
Since funds with higher cash holdings 
are not subject to the same sensitivity 
as funds with low cash or leveraged 
assets, one of the simplest solutions is 
then to have funds increase their cash 
on hand. It would be better for the 
funds to take this action themselves, 
but each fund operates without taking 
into account the negative externali-
ties they put on the market, and it is 
doubtful that few, if any, consider the 
aggregate effects of too few funds 
maintaining sufficient levels of liquid-
ity. Some guidelines concerning cash 
holding could thus be helpful. What 
that percentage of assets held in cash 
would be is not obvious, and regard-
less of whether it is the government 
or the funds themselves that induce 
larger cash holdings, any increase 
could be costly for fund performance.8
The second recommendation 
involves tracking the liquidity of the 
overall bond market. As noted, sensi-
tivity increases in times of illiquidity, 
therefore outflows might pose sys-
temic risk. In times of U.S. macroeco-
nomic distress, emergency rules could 
be instituted, including “suspension 
of redemption,” which means that 
if more than a certain (to be deter-
mined) percentage of outflows occur 
on a single day, investors would be 
prohibited from pulling their money 
out of a fund in order to prevent a 
potentially risky chain of events. This 
rule could be necessary if the man-
ner in which redemption prices are 
calculated (see option three) or the 
frequency of trading on the second-
ary market do not change. Another 
emergency rule could be “redemption 
in kind.” If a fund finds itself at risk of 
a fire sale, the fund could be allowed 
to give the investors who are pulling 
out their money the underlying assets 
instead of cash. This way, investors 
internalize the full consequences of 
their redemptions on the value of 
the assets. This rule is very hard to 
implement and, while worth looking 
into, may not be the best solution, as 
it is difficult to know which assets to 
transfer to investors, how they should 
be split, etc.
Finally, option three entails 
policies that deal with the first-mover 
advantage problem and the associated 
amplification of outflows by chang-
ing the way funds calculate redemp-
tion prices. At present, fund prices 
do not take into account the effect 
of flows for the current trading day. 
As a result, the price that investors 
get upon redemption is not reflective 
of how many other investors have 
traded that day. There can be a very 
5publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
large difference between the price of a 
fund at 4:00 PM on a Tuesday and the 
re-calculated price in later days after 
liquidations of assets have occurred. 
One way to deal with this issue is by 
implementing a forward-looking net 
asset value (NAV) calculation, in the 
spirit of “swing pricing.” Swing pric-
ing takes into account both the last 
NAV and the amount of redemptions 
during a given day in order to factor 
in future liquidation costs. While this 
practice is difficult to implement in 
the market, it is something that many 
other countries have already utilized. 
Once the change is made, it could 
help alleviate the aforementioned 
price uncertainty that can fuel runs. 
It is a recommendation supported in 
Basel III, implemented in the EU, and 
there are, in fact, some multinational 
corporations, including BlackRock, 
that already use it for their operations 
outside the United States. 
conclUSIon
There is no magic bullet that elimi-
nates all possible fragility inherent in 
corporate bond funds. From a greater 
economic perspective, it would be 
beneficial to eliminate or reduce the 
first-mover advantage problem. But 
having funds hold more cash, chang-
ing the pricing rules of funds, and 
restricting redemptions all carry costs 
as well. Regulating one part of the 
financial system, either from a policy 
position or from within the financial 
industry, will change the operation 
of other parts and create new risks, 
so implementing any of the options 
noted above in a manner that reduces 
their costs is just as important as 
implementing the changes themselves.
Investors have flocked to bond 
funds, especially corporate bond 
funds, since the beginning of the 
global economic crisis, viewing them 
as the “safest” vehicles for their capital. 
But bond funds are subject to fragili-
ties originating from the first-mover 
advantage problem similar to money 
market funds and depository banks. 
With a market of their size, doing 
nothing to alleviate the negative 
implications of the first-mover advan-
tage and reduce accelerated outflows 
is likely riskier than attempting to 
mitigate the problem in some way.
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